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Christian Krijnen
The Very Idea of Organization: 
Towards a Hegelian Exposition
Abstract: The contemporary debate on the social ontological foundations of 
organization does not, for methodological reasons, sufficiently get a grip on the 
phenomenon of organization. The original determinacy of organization remains 
presupposed. To render this implicit meaning of organization explicit, another, 
more embracing and in-depth methodology is needed. German idealist types of 
philosophy provide an extremely powerful methodology. In the philosophy of 
German idealism from Kant to Hegel, along with neo-Kantianism and up to 
contemporary transcendental philosophy, however, the idea of organization is 
not addressed. Indeed, it is a challenge to construct the idea of organization from 
the perspective of German idealism: the perspective of reason, and with that, of 
freedom. It results in a new framework for dealing with organization in theory 
and practice. The article constructs the idea of organization (and claims that it 
still makes sense to do so) within the framework of G.W.F. Hegel. It shows where 
the issue of organization should be addressed topologically in Hegel’s system of 
philosophy and what, then, organization shows to be here speculatively.
Keywords: social ontology, organization, Hegel, transcendental philosophy, 
philosophy of the social sciences
Organization as a Philosophical Problem
A closer look into the contemporary debate in organization studies about 
the foundations of organizational research, the so called ‘meta-theoretical 
debate’, shows that this debate is running into difficulties regarding the ba-
sic concept of the reality that organization studies deal with, that is to say, 
regarding the ontology of organization. The meta-theoretical debate pos-
es the question: what is an organization? In what follows, I shall present an 
answer to this question by means of a proper exposition of the concept of 
organization from a Hegelian perspective. An exposition does not aim to 
produce a full-blown philosophy of organization, rather, its purpose is to 
supply a well-determined beginning of a philosophy of organization with-
in the system of philosophy: it reveals the place of the concept of organiza-
tion, and with that its initial determinacy. For reasons of space, I shall focus 
on methodological aspects concerning the construction of the concept of 
organization. Let me first elucidate the reason for this, at first sight, rather 
abstruse approach.
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An ontology, i.e. a theory of an object, a matter, as such, and more precisely, 
a social ontology, i.e. an ontology of the social sphere, is a core issue of the 
‘meta-theoretical’ debate within organizational research. In the eighties and 
nineties of the last century, this debate was largely dominated by researchers 
operating from the point of view of either positivism (e.g. Donaldson 2003) 
or social constructionism—also called: social constructivism or post-mod-
ernism (e.g. Linstead 2004; Westwood and Linstead 2001). Since the middle 
of the nineties, ‘critical realism’ has become an important participant in it (cf. 
e.g. Reed 2000, 2005; Danermark, ed. 2002; Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000; 
Fleetwood and Ackroyd, eds. 2004). 
The main contributors to the foundational discourse that accompanies or-
ganizational research are social scientists: the debate is an internal one with-
in the social sciences. From the perspective of philosophy and its standards, 
however, it cannot be overlooked that in this foundational debate philo-
sophical concepts are used but that a sufficient reflection on the determination 
and validity of these concepts is lacking. An in-depth reflection on this debate 
directly leads to an idealist approach as paradigmatically developed within 
the tradition of German idealism, and its relevance for contemporary social 
philosophy (Krijnen 2015: chap. 1).
Against this background, I have tried to carve out the approach of Kantian 
transcendental philosophy (as it has taken shape particularly in neo-Kantian-
ism and contemporary transcendental philosophy) and of Hegel’s philosophy 
regarding the foundations of social reality, and to confront both approach-
es with each other. The result of this exploration eventually boiled down to 
a Hegelian turn in social ontology and a corresponding construction of the 
concept of organization (Krijnen 2015). Therefore, the upcoming exposition 
of the concept of organization follows Hegel’s line of thought. 
Before exposing the concept of organization, it seems opportune to make 
three important methodological remarks, concerning the more general no-
tion of the ‘social’, to which the more specific notion of ‘organization’ ap-
parently belongs. 
First, seen from the perspective of a history of the problems of philosophy 
(Problemgeschichte), the concept of the social traditionally belongs to the do-
main of ‘practical philosophy’, particularly political philosophy, including 
philosophy of law and the state, and moral (ethical) philosophy (Röttgers 
2002: 25ff.). The social as a genuine, independent, specific realm of mean-
ing only became a concept for theoretical and philosophical determination 
in the course of the nineteenth century. Hence, the social is younger than 
the philosophy of German idealism. As a consequence, we are referred to 
post-Hegelian history. Post-Hegelian history supplies the material for us, 
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when we aim to construct the social in Hegel’s philosophy. Moreover, it can 
be shown that the history of the social and of social philosophy begins with 
the neo-Kantian movement (Röttgers 2002: 47ff.). This movement dominat-
ed the philosophical discourse the last decades of the nineteenth and the first 
of the twentieth century. Therefore, neo-Kantiansm, the subsequent Kantian 
transcendental philosophy inspired by it, and Hegel make up the spectrum 
of idealist philosophical positions for constructing sociality.
Second, in the course of this construction the possibility of addressing the 
concept of organization emerges philosophically: The problem of ‘actualiz-
ing freedom’ (Hegel) or ‘realizing validity’ (Kantian transcendental philos-
ophy) implies the issue of organization as a subsequent social philosophical 
topic. The social is essentially the realm of realizing values, to articulate it in 
terms of Kantian transcendental philosophy, or that of objective spirit as the 
realm of actualizing freedom, to apply Hegel’s terminology. Realizing valid-
ity, actualizing freedom, however, is conceived of differently in both tradi-
tions. Whereas Hegel conceptualizes actualizing freedom as a development 
of unconditionedness (development of free spirit in the realm of objective 
spirit), Kantian transcendental philosophy conceptualizes it as a develop-
ment from conditionality into unconditionedness (i.e. from conditional into 
unconditional self-formation of the subject, from conditional validity into 
unconditional validity).
The former model of development turns out to be more advantageous (Krij-
nen 2015: chap. 4). From a systematical point of view, therefore, it is more 
promising to accomplish the exposition of the concept of organization within 
the framework of Hegel’s philosophy. Nevertheless, in the course of a thor-
ough confrontation between the conception of realizing validity of Kantian 
transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s conception of actualizing freedom, a 
perspective occurs that is very relevant for the concept of organization, though 
not addressed by Hegel. This perspective is related to freedom, but it does 
not qualify figures of unconditionedness on the level of unconditionedness. 
In fact, it concerns another dimension: the dimension of their inner instru-
mental (teleological) purposefulness. To put it less ambiguously, it concerns 
the dimension of their inner purposive (appropriate) organization conform 
the idea or value of utility, and with that of the economic-social fundamen-
tal values of economic and social profitability, sustainability, and favorability 
(cf. on these values Flach (1997: 137 ff.))—the purposeful organization of fig-
ures of objective spirit. This yields a very complex subsequent social philo-
sophical topic, in need of further exploration: the philosophical exposition of 
the concept of organization, hence, of a basic concept of the social sciences. 
Third, the methodological issue of revisiting phenomenology. What is at is-
sue here? At the beginning of the series of investigations into social ontology 
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in general and organization in particular, a phenomenology is necessary in 
order to scientifically establish organization as a legitimate issue for philo-
sophical explorations.1 In discussion with what Kant calls the ‘fruitful bathos 
of experience’, that is to say, with determinations of organization supplied by 
organization studies including its meta-theoretical debate, a desideratum has 
been achieved. It transpired that determinations of organizations resulting 
from a direct relation to its object (intentio prima et recta) always presuppose 
the original determinacy and validity of ‘organization’, and hence, of a more 
original concept of organization in need of philosophical exploration. This 
exploration is forced to go beyond the present meta-theoretical debate on 
organization too. Therefore, in the course of the initial phenomenology at 
most ‘organization’ has been established as a genuine philosophical problem. 
This, however, does not suffice for an exposition of the concept of organiza-
tion. An exposition requires considerably more material determinations of 
organization, which need to be ordered successively in a justified way. These 
material determinations also have to be delivered phenomenologically.2 That 
is to say that phenomenology should be revisited. Revisiting phenomenology 
addresses the history of organization and organization theory concerning 
contents relevant for the basic features of organization. As a result, based 
on the current state of affairs in relation to organization theory, a general 
concept of organization with a maximal extension is established. This con-
cept also integrates the history of philosophy, in particular of political phi-
losophy, a branch of philosophy organization theory refers to frequently. 
To give attention to the history of political philosophy, however, requires a 
strong reconstructive approach, as in that history organization is not a top-
ic on its own: at most it is addressed implicitly. Organization in the sense 
of organization theory is not specifically thematic in the history of philos-
ophy before Hegel, or more generally, in history as such; in fact, it is mainly 
co-addressed in other contexts.
That this is in fact the case also transpires from the perspective of the his-
tory of the concept (Begriffsgeschichte) of organization (cf. Dohrn-van Ros-
sum and Böckenförde 1972). To the days of German idealism, the concept of 
1 This function of a phenomenology stems from Hegel’s Phänomenologie too insofar as 
this work is an introduction into thought as the speculative subject matter of philosophy 
(Logik). It is also guiding for, among other philosophers, Edmund Husserl, who corre-
spondingly distinguishes between a ‘phenomenological’ reduction and an ‘eidetic’ one. 
Also the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband or the contemporary transcendental philos-
opher Hans Wagner, for instance, offer a phenomenology in the sketched sense. Cf. 
Krijnen 2008: 59-62 incl. note 13 and pp. 67 ff.
2 Whereas Hegel’s Phänomenologie, by contrast, is from the start developed from ma-
terial determinations, and the Enzyklopädie continuously integrates the historically 
available meanings of a concept. 
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organization remains primarily connected to the context of right and state. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the concept of organization broad-
ens its scope of application and becomes established as a guiding concept for 
discussions about a conscious change of the society and its order. It concerns 
a discussion that not least emerges from the social antagonism that went 
along with the working population of the nineteenth century. The concept 
of organization, then, is extended. It refers to the connection of many, pur-
suing common purposes, entities, capable of goal-setting and goal-realizing 
by actions. Hence, the restriction to arrangements and business processes in 
the realm of the state and politics is disclosed. The concept of organization is 
transformed into a technical term of the emerging business studies and of so-
ciology, and finally even into a fundamental concept of interpersonal activity.
Such explorations into the history of the meaning of the concept of organi-
zation lead to at least two different insights, which are significant for com-
prehending organization philosophically, in first instance and, of course, 
significant for the exposition of organization as a phenomenon of spirit. 
First, a general concept of organization with a maximal extension comes to 
light. Second, perspectives or paradigms of organizational research come into 
focus; organization theory conceptually determines the general concept of 
organization within such perspectives.
Concerning the latter, scholars continuously emphasize that organizational 
research can only be achieved within the framework of fundamental points 
of view, regardless of whether they are called ‘definitions’, ‘perspectives’, ‘par-
adigms’, ‘views’, or ‘concepts’ of organization (Scott 2003; Geus 1989; Strati 
2000; Diest 2010; Reed 2005). Such fundamental points of view first con-
stitute the field of organizational research and are supposed to be neither 
verifiable empirically within a certain paradigm nor can they be fully rec-
onciled by scientific research, as this research itself is based on fundamental 
assumptions about the subject matter of organizational research. Therefore, 
it is all the more surprising that within organization theory we can observe 
a dominating overarching concept of organization. This concept seems both 
regarding its form and matter not to relate to a paradigm. Hence, we are 
facing a dominant paradigm-unladen concept of organization. Moreover, 
this dominant paradigm-unladen concept does not conceive of organiza-
tion merely as a specific, restricted phenomenon, for example of the mod-
ern economy, but as a human phenomenon sui generis. 
According to this concept, organization consists of a) humans, b) cooperating 
c) in order to achieve a purpose or several purposes. Sociality, explicit de-
terminations of purposes, and coordination (formalization) characterize the 
phenomenon of organization as the subject matter of organization studies. 
This general determination of organization makes up the foundation for 
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distinguishing different perspectives (paradigms, etcetera) of organizational re-
search. These perspectives supply us with aspects that are superordinate and 
yet immediately materially related to organization. These material aspects, as 
far as they are relevant, need to be translated into the intended philosophical 
concept of organization. Without doubt, existing attempts by the social sci-
ences and philosophy to determine organization and its foundations concep-
tually are important material. The meaning and significance of this material 
itself, however, is to be determined by a genuine philosophy of organization, 
aiming to determine systematically the concept that is in need of determina-
tion: the concept of organization. As far as a philosophical exposition of the 
concept of organization is concerned, the available material is of only rudi-
mentary relevance (by contrast, it is all the more relevant for a doctrinal elab-
oration of the concept of organization). This relevance has already become 
manifest: it was by means of a phenomenological consideration that we have 
been able to come up with a general concept of organization based on orga-
nization theory. It is this phenomenologically established concept that needs 
to be exposed speculatively. In order to do so, in first instance, it needs to be 
clarified where in Hegel’s philosophy such an exposition should take place.
Organization in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, topologically
Revisiting phenomenology results in a rich, rewarding, and at the same time 
fundamental determination of organization from the perspective of organi-
zation theory. If we connect the material collected phenomenologically with 
Hegel’s philosophy, then it becomes apparent that the attempt to determine 
organization is related to a number of themes addressed in Hegel’s philoso-
phy, especially in his philosophy of spirit: freedom, survival, creativity, the-
oretical and practical epistemic competencies, the plurality of subjects and 
problems of order and coordination accompanying it, the abstract charac-
ter of systems of rules and their embedding in shared forms of normativity, 
the dependence of the activity of the subject on a natural and personal en-
vironment, and so forth. Differing from current concepts of organization in 
terms of ‘perspectives’ etcetera, Hegel does not hive off the indicated aspects 
but conceives of them in their intrinsic relationship.
Where in Hegel’s philosophy of sprit , then, is the phenomenon of organiza-
tion to be located initially? That is to say, where in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit 
should it be located conceptually as a topic for philosophical investigation?
The answer that organization is a figure of free spirit could pave the way for 
finding its appropriate place. There are many good reasons for taking orga-
nization as a figure of free spirit. They come to light by focusing on the gen-
eral and most comprehensive determination of organization that appeared 
to underlie the ‘definitions’, ‘perspectives’, and ‘paradigms’ of organization: 
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organizations consist of humans, cooperating in order to achieve a purpose 
or several purposes. 
From this, we can conclude first that the phenomenon of organization, as 
addressed by organizational research, is not a phenomenon of subjective spirit 
but of objective spirit. Organization is a figure of the spirit, to put it in terms 
of “free spirit,” that “knows” and “wants” itself as free, spirit that has freedom, 
the “essence” of spirit, to its determination and makes its own freedom to its 
“purpose.” (Hegel 1991: §§ 481 with 482, cf. 469) This form of spirit realizes 
itself in an externally found objectivity, transforming this objectivity into a 
world that is determined by free spirit. This dimension of objectifying free-
dom represents a departure from the subjective dimension as a ‘relation to 
itself’. Within the context of the philosophy of objective spirit, Hegel con-
ceives of free spirit as a “purpose activity” (Hegel 1991: § 484), striving to 
bring the inner (essential, free) determination of spirit into being. Organi-
zation is not a natural product: it is a result of humans giving shape to the 
world, and hence, the result of freedom or free-spiritual endeavors—a shape 
of humans that are the subject of theoretical and practical activity. 
All these affinities with Hegel’s philosophy of spirit should not lead to los-
ing sight of another issue no less important—‘organization’ is as such not 
thematic in Hegel’s doctrine of free spirit and its figures (although aspects 
of organization are occasionally touched upon). This is a significant insight. 
It will continuously play a role in the following and in the course of that ob-
tain a more precise determination. What matters now is to set organization 
apart from the figures of objective spirit, while at the same time making 
plausible that the concept of organization contains a concern that deserves 
to be translated into a philosophical concept.
The conducted phenomenology of the concept of organization finally result-
ed in organization as the form of conscious cooperative purposive activity. 
The philosophy of organization has to determine this form. In doing so, it 
determines what conscious cooperative purposive activity itself is. It is hard-
ly a surprise that the purposeful organization of figures of objective spirit 
was and is mainly discussed in terms of ‘instrumental rationality’. The mere 
instrumental view on actualizing purposes, however, has been overcome in 
principle within contemporary transcendental philosophy (by the econom-
ic-social idea); actually, the instrumental view has neither been guiding He-
gel’s philosophy of objective spirit—which is a doctrine of the objectification 
of free spirit (Krijnen 2015: chap. 4). Hence, organization should be compre-
hended as a moment of the unconditionedness of figures of objective spirit.
In this regard, it has to be emphasized that organization concern utility. Or-
ganizations are conscious cooperative alliances of humans in order to achieve 
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purposes, goal-determined, goal-oriented communities, focused on actualiz-
ing purposes. Organization as a topic or figure of objective spirit, however, 
does not concern these objective figures themselves as unconditional forms 
of shaping human subjectivity or forms of free spirit. Organization concerns 
another dimension: the dimension of inner purposefulness of these objective 
figures of freedom, videlicet their inner arrangement according to the idea 
or value of the utile. Hence, the arrangement of objective figures in confor-
mity with the purpose of utility becomes the issue to consider; an arrange-
ment, whose free form itself is guaranteed by the figures of objective spirit 
themselves: they are figures of free spirit.
These considerations differ from Hegel’s insofar as Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit and its development are guided by self-knowledge of the idea as spir-
it, intending to comprehend spirit as the “producer of its own freedom” and 
the development of the concept of spirit as spirit “freeing” itself from “all 
forms of existence not adequate to its concept.” (Hegel 1971: vol. 8, § 382 A) 
The figures of existence of free spirit as objective spirit themselves and their 
relationships are the subject matter of Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit. 
The function that a certain figure has for actualizing freedom, and hence, the 
determinacy of this figure, is the issue, not the inner arrangement of a figure 
of objective spirit according to the idea of utility as the effectivity and effi-
ciency of conscious actualization of purposes.3 Effectivity, here, is not focused 
on the function for freedom a figure of objective spirit has, and hence, on 
the relevant form of actualizing purposes itself, but on a concrete content as 
the purpose that free spirits intend to actualize. The focus is not on the pre-
suppositions of successful actualization of purposes: these presuppositions 
must count as fulfilled, as otherwise there would not exist any actualization 
of a purpose at all, which would make the question concerning its useful ar-
rangement superfluous. The exposition of the concept of organization and 
the subsequent development of its principles are the answer to this question.
Where does the concept of organization occur? To put it more precisely, 
where would the concept of organization have occurred as an issue to be 
comprehended philosophically if Hegel had addressed it specifically? To an-
swer this question, one should be mindful of the place in the system of phi-
losophy where the concept of organization, which resulted from revisiting 
phenomenology, can be captured most appositely.
A first run-through of the philosophy of spirit resulted in objective spirit as 
the place where the concept of organization has to be exposed. Seen more 
3 These concepts are to be understood in the general sense mentioned, and hence, not 
from the start in an economically reduced sense (a legal system is useful too—not, how-
ever, because it is financially more profitable to have one instead of none, but because it 
is useful for the freedom of the subject).
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closely, objective spirit contains three different forms of actualizing freedom: 
(abstract) right, morality, and Sittlichkeit. It is illuminating to go through these 
forms via negativa, that is to say, by excluding options.
Abstract right only contains an abstract rationality of right. As an organized 
(and guaranteed) legal system, right is addressed on the level of Sittlichkeit 
(Hegel 1991: §§ 488–502; 1955: §§ 34–104). Basically, the same applies to 
morality. Morality concerns the inner constitution of the will of the person 
(Hegel 1991: § 503; cf. 1955: § 105). Both are relevant for organizational phe-
nomena and part of their determinacy. However, they do not qualify such 
phenomena specifically. As a result, Sittlichkeit remains as the adequate place 
of exposition. Here, in the “living good” (Hegel 1955: § 142), the abstractness 
of both the objectivity of a formal system of rules of right and of the will re-
flected in itself has been overcome in favor of a substantial will.
Although particularly the early texts of organization theory offer a rather 
wide concept of organization, which includes families too, on the basis of the 
concept of organization gathered phenomenologically—having a relatively 
high formalized social structure and a relatively specific purpose-determi-
nacy—family in the Hegelian sense becomes no longer relevant. Rather, it is 
civil society which constitutes the proper place to expose the concept of or-
ganization within Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. Here, we are dealing with in-
dependent free spirits that have their particular interests “in their conscious 
and as their purpose” (Hegel 1991: § 523). Yet, this only forms for Hegel “the 
one principle of civil society” (Hegel 1955: § 182). Hegel conceives of them in 
their relatedness: The “relation” (Hegel 1955: § 182) to other such particular 
persons, all striving to actualize their particular interests—hence, the “me-
diating relation of independent extremes” (Hegel 1991: § 523)—is the other 
principle of civil society (Hegel 1955: § 182). More precisely and by implica-
tion, the “self-seeking end in its actualization” (Hegel 1955: § 183) concerns a 
“system of atomism” (Hegel 1991: § 523), a system of “all-around dependence” 
(Hegel 1955: § 183), a Sittlichkeit “lost in its extremes” (Hegel 1955: § 184). 
Hegel denotes this system initially also as an “external state,” as a “state of 
understanding” or of “need” (Not- und Verstandesstaat).4 In this kind of state, 
the citizens are private persons that all have their own interest as their pur-
pose; the universal, hence, appears for them merely as a “means.” With this, 
however, they at the same time determine their knowing, wanting, and act-
ing “in conformity with the universal,” making themselves into a “link in the 
chain” of this relation, which is the state (Hegel 1955: § 187). Organization 
just is such an external state, a state of understanding.
4 Hegel 1955: § 183; cf. Hegel 1991: § 523. The Not- und Verstandesstaat stands in con-
trast to the “proper political” (Hegel 1955: § 268) or “substantial” state (Hegel 1991: § 534).
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In order to characterize the concept of organization more in detail via neg-
ativa, it makes sense to relate it to the first moment of civil society, that is 
the “system of needs” (Hegel 1991: §§ 524 ff.; 1955: §§ 189 ff.), as well as to 
distinguish organization from ‘economy’, hence, from a sphere that is of ma-
jor interest in Hegel’s doctrine of civil society. In addition, it is important to 
distinguish between Hegel’s perspective of knowledge of civil society and 
the perspective that is required by a conceptual development of the concept 
of organization.
It firstly can be noted that by determining organization as an external state, 
organization is not conceived of as merely ‘instrumentally’: organization has 
turned into a moment of something higher or more universal that is free-
dom. This aspect of being a moment of a higher determination of freedom, 
and hence, of having a specific function for actualizing freedom, constitutes 
the focus of Hegel’s considerations. The purpose of the civil society is to sat-
isfy the needs in a “stable and universal way, videlicet to secure this satisfac-
tion” (Hegel 1991: § 533). Hegel certainly does not identify the civil society 
with the sphere of modern economy. Civil society is a figure of right as the 
existence of freedom; solely as a moment of the existence of freedom is the 
modern economy itself possible regarding its rationality, that is to say, pos-
sible as a rational expression of modern subjectivity.
Freedom’s functional moments determine the course of Hegel’s conceptual 
development. Hegel addresses the relevance the various figures of objective 
spirit have for freedom (their ‘right’ as existence of freedom). Organiza-
tion theory, by contrast, is interested in the inner arrangement of an ob-
jective-spiritual figure in conformity with the idea of utility, understood as 
efficiency and effectivity of conscious purpose-actualization. This not only 
marks a difference to the relevant perspective of knowledge. The perspec-
tive of knowledge of organization theory also differs from that of economics. 
Economics in particular plays an important role for Hegel’s elaborations on 
the system of needs. Under the title of “system of needs” he deals with themes 
like needs and their satisfaction, labor and optimizing its productivity, assets 
(Vermögen) and the economic division in the form of estates (Stände) relat-
ed to it, in short, economic constellations. Here, humans are to some extent 
conceived of as a utility factor, as in the context of need satisfaction, the ten-
dency to increase the abstract character of labor (specialization of produc-
tion processes and division of labor) leads the “dependencies” and “inter-re-
lations” of humans into “total necessity” (Hegel 1955: § 198), and hence, into 
“unconditioned dependency” of the societal context (Hegel 1991: § 526). 
Both economics and organization theory are concerned with optimizing 
welfare, and thereby with ‘utility’ too; yet, their respective subject matter 
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differs: organization theory is bothered with the organizational aspect, eco-
nomics with the economic aspect. The organizational aspect concerns the 
form of social units in which purposes are actualized. Basically, ‘sociological’ 
points of view guide the concern. The economic dimension is a specification 
of this form of actualizing purposes. In contrast to organization theory, eco-
nomics (Volkswirtschaftslehre) deals with, as it is put today, macro-economic 
and micro-economic issues. 
The highlighted differences can be formalized as follows. Economy itself is 
a figure (shape) of objective spirit, or more precisely, of Sittlichkeit, whereas 
organization only concerns a formal aspect of this figure: the orientation to-
wards the cooperative actualization of the purposes of economic behavior. 
Organizations as phenomena of spirit, therefore, only exist as commercial 
enterprises, state enterprises, bureaucracies, and so forth. As a consequence, 
organization does not coincide with any of Hegel’s spheres of objective spir-
it. By contrast, organization concerns a subsequent theme. The place to ex-
pose this theme is Hegel’s ‘system of needs’. Organization in itself relates 
to Sittlichkeit as such, as the normativity we are living in and the condition 
of actualizing determined purposes. Organization is effective throughout. 
However, with regard to the two determinations of purpose-determinacy 
and formalization, which are guiding for the concept of organization of or-
ganization theory, organization as an issue should be addressed subsequent 
to the satisfaction of needs in the system of needs.
Concerning Hegel’s concept of the state, this implies two different matters 
to pay attention to: a negative one and a positive one. 
The place to expose the concept of organization is not identical with the place 
the term occurs prominently in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, that is, in the 
elaborations of the (substantial, political) state. For Hegel, organization con-
cerns the actual structure or differentiation of a figure of spirit that is entirely 
free—a free organization of free beings. Hence, the issue at hand is the orga-
nization of freedom. Hegel’s thematization of the organization of freedom, 
however, takes place in a specific regard that differs from that of organization 
theory. For organization theory, the organization of the state only makes up 
one specific type of organization. Moreover, organization theory is not con-
cerned with organization as a way to structure or differentiate the state as the 
actualization of right, and hence, with a figure of objective spirit: organization 
theory is concerned with an aspect of this structure, differentiation, or figure.
Interestingly enough though, in Hegel’s discussion of the state, and especial-
ly of constitutional law, many moments come up for discussion that qual-
ify organization in general, regardless of the pursued purpose, even if He-
gel addresses them only with regard to the state, and hence, with regard to 
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the purpose of the universal. Such moments will become determinations 
of the concept of organization to be exposed. In addition, they exhibit ten-
dencies that can even be taken into account as the fundamental principles 
of organization. 
Pursuing and actualizing particular interests requires, as a condition of its 
own possibility, something universal that retains and penetrates it. Organi-
zations must have a constitution that suits their particular purpose, just as 
the state, as focused on the universal, has a constitution that suits its pur-
pose. Hence, the constitution of the state as a structure that mediates between 
the universal and the particular, both in an objective (constitution) and a 
subjective (disposition) direction, concerns a specification of organization. 
Something universal is acknowledged consciously, and by implication, the 
mediating structure between singularity, particularity, and universality is 
too (regardless whether we can distinguish the recognized universal in the 
political state from the universality of arbitrary actualization of purposes). 
Any organization requires the recognition of some universal, penetrating 
an organized entity. This involves the issue of a functional division, and 
hence issues like the division of labor and its criteria, leadership, (ultimate) 
responsibility, organizational structure, centralism, hierarchy, salary, mor-
al competence, abuse of power, corruption, etcetera (cf. Hegel 1955: §§ 287 
ff.). The orientation towards the universal, as Hegel exemplifies regarding 
the state, can only be preserved by a purposeful division of functional units 
of organization that is differentiated in itself. 
Organization in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, speculatively
It is clear, then, that we can carve out several aspects from Hegel’s doctrine 
of Sittlichkeit to be considered for themselves, that is from the perspective 
of organization. They appear as moments of the concept of organization as 
such, not immediately as moments of self-knowledge of the absolute idea as 
absolute spirit (which is Hegel’s project). These moments, in conformity with 
the method of a philosophical determination of reality, have to be based on 
both the material and the logic of the concept, or in short, on the matter itself.
Concerning the material foundation of organization, we could allusively 
emphasize moments of the concept of organization in Hegel’s philosophy. 
However, an explicit thematization is absent due to the focus of Hegel’s phi-
losophy of spirit. For this reason, superordinate concepts that divide (artic-
ulate) the concept of organization and enable its material differentiation are 
absent too—not to mention their speculative order.
The first task, thus, is to establish superordinate concepts for the  division of the 
concept of organization. Interestingly enough, the history of transcendental 
538
THE VERY IDEA OF ORGANIzATION: TOWARDS A HEGELIAN ExPOSITIONChristian Krijnen
philosophy, more in particular contemporary transcendental philosophies of 
the economic-social, contains potential in this respect. As mentioned already, 
Flach’s analysis of the idea of utility is of interest here. It results in the eco-
nomic-social fundamental values of economic and social profitability, sus-
tainability, and favorability of labor. I have suggested that with these values a 
perspective occurs that is not addressed by Hegel. Although this perspective 
is related to freedom, it does not qualify objective-spiritual figures of un-
conditionedness on the level of unconditionedness. Actually it concerns the 
dimension of the inner instrumental (teleological) purposefulness of these 
figures, that is to say, the dimension of their inner purposive (appropriate) 
organization in conformity with the value of utility.
Flach takes the principles of profitability, sustainability, and favorability into 
account as the fundamental values (or defining moments) of the idea of the 
utile, that is of the idea of the economic-social. Within the framework of a 
Hegelian determination of organization, however, these principles can be 
useful in the determination of the purposive organization of figures of ob-
jective spirit. They depict the basic material moments of Hegel’s doctrine of 
Sittlichkeit regarding its relevance for organization. The triadic structure of 
those principles or fundamental values predisposes them to a speculative 
articulation in conformity with Hegel’s logic of the concept.
In Flach’s elaborations on the economic-social sphere, the concept of labor 
takes center stage (Flach 1997: 141–5), leading to the economic-social fun-
damental values of economic and social profitability, sustainability, and fa-
vorability of labor. The principle of profitability concerns the exploitation 
(Verwertung) of what is (in either way) pre-given, which is accomplished by 
labor. This exploitation is subjected to the purpose of “utility,” which is re-
garded as imperative to establish “profitable relationships,” (profitable in the 
sense of production, calculation, consumption, and welfare). In this way, a 
uniform spectrum of economic-social phenomena is ‘constituted’. The prin-
ciple of sustainability, then, ‘regulates’ these established profitable relation-
ships to the effect that it concerns relationships that “permanently repeat 
themselves,” and hence, relationships that “stabilize themselves.” Only then 
is the exploitation of the given material “truly efficient.” In this regard, the 
principle of favorability takes account of the fact that labor is not uniform, 
which is to say, labor is or should be divided on the basis of “skill” (Geschick-
lichkeit); it should ‘pay off’ for all participants (the individual, group(s)) in 
one way or another.
In order to expose the concept of organization, these three basic values or 
principles need to be linked with the material of Hegel’s doctrine of Sittlich-
keit. As shown above, the system of needs is the proper place to expose the 
concept of organization. Moreover, it also became clear that Hegel’s doctrine 
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of the state contains numerous moments that qualify organization in general. 
The purpose of the civil society has been revealed as securing the satisfac-
tion of needs in a ‘stable and universal way’, which involves the inclusion of 
moments of the state. Hegel goes on to touch upon the issue of the allocation 
of labor, regarding the competences of the subject, and hence the personnel 
allocation of labor, as well as the objective qualification of the allocation of 
labor (its function for actualizing freedom). And that all this should pay off 
for the individuals involved belongs to the disposition of Hegel’s doctrine 
of the civil society: the civil society is about enabling individuals to pursue 
their own welfare according to their own opinion. The same applies to the 
state: its essential functions include secure welfare.
In short, the divisional concepts of the economic-social, taken from Flach’s 
transcendental philosophy, have a material foundation in Hegel’s philosophy. 
Articulating them speculatively involves logically modeling Flach’s Kantian 
schematism of constitution and regulation into a relation of Hegelian uni-
versality, particularity, and singularity. As a result, the fundamental values 
of profitability, sustainability, and favorability would be translated into the 
Hegelian ‘concept’. Admittedly, such a translation into the logic of the concept 
can only concern making it plausible that the divisional concepts mentioned 
are capable of being interpreted as the moments of the concept, which are 
the universal, particular, and singular. To develop them in terms of a log-
ic of the concept, a logic of judgment, and a logic of inference would tran-
scend the task and purpose of the present study: to present the place of the 
concept of organization in the system of philosophy, and hence, to expose it.
First, it is an important methodological feature of a speculative philosophy 
that determinations do not join in ‘externally’: that they do not stem from 
an outward position but from an “immanent deduction” (Hegel 1951: 219).5 
Accordingly, “the concept as such” contains itself the moments of univer-
sality, particularity, and singularity (Hegel 1991: § 163); the concept is the 
“concrete par excellence” (Hegel 1991: § 164; cf. Arndt et al., eds. 2006; Koch 
et al., eds. 2003; Düsing 1986; Fulda 1978). As a result, the concept is only 
determined by itself, and not by any externality. Therefore, the beginning of 
a speculative sequence of concept development is as a beginning something 
immediate (Hegel 1951: 488). The meaning of the progress, again, is that the 
beginning, as the abstract universality it is, determines itself, becomes ‘for it-
self’ the universal (Hegel 1951: 490). Subsequently, the achieved result turns 
into a beginning again (Hegel 1951: 499). The method extends itself into a 
“system” of determinations of thought (Hegel 1951: 500).
5 As it is put in the Philosophy of Right: “the immanent differentiation of the concept 
itself” (Hegel 1955: § 33 R).
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Regarding specifically the free will as the starting concept of the philosophy 
of objective spirit, the free will must initially count as “immediate,” then as 
“reflected in itself,” and finally as the unity of both determinations, that is 
as “substantial” will (Hegel 1991: § 487). By implication, it contains in itself 
the “pure indeterminacy,” “universality” (Hegel 1955: § 5), the “transition 
from undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation and determination,” 
“particularization” (Hegel 1955: § 6), and the “unity of these both moments,” 
the “particularity that is reflected in itself, and hence, restored to universali-
ty—singularity,” veracious “self-determination” (Hegel 1955: § 7). Therefore, 
it contains exactly that “freedom of the will” that makes up its “concept or 
substantiality” (Hegel 1955: § 7). The same constellation occurs within the 
sphere of Sittlichkeit: the “substance of Sittlichkeit (sittliche Substanz)” initially 
is an “immediate” spirit (“family”), then a “relative totality of relative relations 
between individuals as independent persons in a formal universality” (“civil 
society”), and finally the “self-conscious substance” (“state-constitution” (He-
gel 1991: § 517)), “substantial universality” (Hegel 1955: § 157).
The civil society, as the external state, or as Hegel also puts it, as a state of un-
derstanding, contains as its first moment precisely the moment that turned 
out to be the starting point for an exposition of the concept of organization: 
“The mediation of need and the satisfaction of the individual through its la-
bor and through the work and satisfaction of the needs of all the others—the 
system of needs” (Hegel 1955: § 188; 1991: § 524)). The ‘reflected Sittlichkeit’ 
of the external state, which is an organization as such, has 
a) as its abstract universal determination of the beginning the determinacy 
that qualifies organizational phenomena in general or as such. Hence, it con-
stitutes phenomena as organizational phenomena. This determination con-
cerns the satisfaction of particular needs by a productive activity that is labor 
(cf. also Hegel 1955: § 196, and for Hegel’s concept of labor, e.g., Schmidt am 
Busch 2002). Labor exploits pre-given material. The formation of pre-giv-
en material by labor is subjected to the directive of profitability, or of “util-
ity,“ oriented towards establishing these or those “profitable relationships.”
b) This universal dimension of establishing profitable relationships is par-
ticularized by specifying them into relationships that “permanently repeat,” 
“stabilize,” “maintain,” and therefore “sublimate” themselves. The formation 
of pre-given material, more specifically, is hence subjected to the directive 
of sustainability of labor.
c) The substantial unity and truth of immediacy and reflection in itself, of ab-
stract profitability and particular sustainability, is achieved only on the ba-
sis of a skilled allocation of labor over the individuals (and, of course, by the 
respective execution). The principle of favorability of labor assures that the 
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effort ‘pays off’, that labor is self-determined labor, and hence, that labor is 
actual establishment of profitable relationships. 
As a result, we have reached the idea in its universal existence in and for it-
self, to be more precise, the idea of organization. 
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Kristijan Krajnen
Sama ideja organizacije: ka hegelijanskom izlaganju
Apstrakt
 Savremena debata o socijalno ontološkim osnovama organizacije, iz metodo-
loških razloga, nedovoljno zahvata fenomen organizacije. Početno određenje 
organizacije ostaje pretpostavljeno. Da bi se ovo implicitno značenje – toga šta 
organizacija jeste – učinilo eksplicitnim, potrebna je drugačija, obuhvatnija i te-
meljnija metodologija. Filozofija nemačkog idealizma pruža veoma moćnu me-
todologiju. Međutim, u filozofiji nemačkog idealizma od Kanta do Hegela, neo-kan-
tijanizma, pa sve do savremene transcendentalne filozofije, ideja organizacije 
nije obrađivana. Odista, izazov je konstruisati ideju organizacije iz tako idealistič-
ke perspektive: perspektive razuma i, uz to, slobode. Ovo nam pruža novi okvir 
za bavljenje organizacijom u teoriji i praksi. Članak konstruiše ideju organizacije 
(i drži se toga da i dalje ima smisla to raditi) unutar okvira G. V. F. Hegela. Poka-
zuje gde bi, topološki gledano, problemi organizacije trebalo da se obrađuju u 
Hegelovom filozofskom sistemu i, stoga, šta se ovde pokazuje da organizacija 
jeste spekulativno.
Ključne reči: socijalna ontologija, organizacija, Hegel, transcendentalna filozofija, 
filozofija društvenih nauka   
